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The technological progress on the digital processing has an impact on the 
approach to the detection and localization of electromagnetic sources. 
 
In this technical report, we present a monitoring system to detect mobile satellite 
terminals in the open sea. The monitoring system is based on high gain antennas and 
amplifiers and the correlation of the known spectrum responses. The monitoring system 
can be implemented using low-cost component and it can be deployed in the patrolling 
boats. 
 
The prototype can be improved and deployed on the vessels of the coast guard or 
the navy, which have the responsibility to patrol the sea for illegal immigrants and piracy 
activities. A similar monitoring system can also be installed on Unmanned Air Vehicles 
(UAV) used for the same purpose. 
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The technological progress on the digital processing has an impact on the 
approach to the detection and localization of electromagnetic sources. 
 
In this technical report, we present a monitoring system to detect mobile satellite 
terminals in the open sea. The monitoring system is based on high gain antennas and 
amplifiers and the correlation of the known spectrum responses. The monitoring system 
can be implemented using low-cost component and it can be deployed in the patrolling 
boats. 
 
The prototype can be improved and deployed on the vessels of the coast guard or 
the navy, which have the responsibility to patrol the sea for illegal immigrants and piracy 
activities. A similar monitoring system can also be installed on Unmanned Air Vehicles 
(UAV) used for the same purpose. 
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1. Maritime security and mobile satellite communications 
 
1.1.  Awareness of the maritime domain 
 
Two main threats to today’s maritime security are immigration and piracy. An 
essential capability to address these threats is the Awareness of the Maritime Domain 
(MDA). Availability of data related to Automatic Identification System (AIS), Vessel 
Monitoring System (VMS), coastal radar tracks and satellite Vessel Detection System 
(VDS) reports are reliable MDA sources. A number of technologies have been proposed 
to locate and identify vessels used for criminal activities in the open sea. Data fusion 
from each of these sources can be integrated with accessible data from Vessel Traffic 
Surveillance (VTS) networks and GIS data to improve the overall detection threshold as 
described in [1]. The DECLIMS project (see [2]) used detection of widespread satellite 




Figure 1 Last accessible positions of telephone handsets used by illegal immigrants in the 
Mediterranean area 
 
A number of commercial systems are available including Iridium, Globalstar, 
Thuraya, Inmarsat and others. Each mobile satellite system has various levels of 
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coverage. For example, Iridium has a world-wide coverage while Thuraya-2 has coverage 
of the Middle East as well as major parts of Africa and Europe (see [3]). The Mumbai 
terrorists of 26/11/2008 used Thuraya for calls from their fishing boat prior to the attacks 
[4]. The use of mobile satellite systems by pirates in the Red Sea has been reported by a 
number of sources such as [5] and [14]. Illegal immigrants in the Mediterranean also use 
mobile satellite terminals as reported in [6].  
Figure 1 shows the automatic self reported GPS positions of Thuraya terminals in 
the Mediterranean. Handset icons with a circle show the last position of the eight 
different terminals, while the handset icons with a cross show the last two positions of 
one terminal of the same boats. 
1.2.  Maritime security aspects in the use of mobile satellite 
communications 
 
Criminals use mobile satellite communications to communicate among 
themselves and coordinate an attack or to communicate with other agents on the land. 
While, normal GSM/UMTS terminals can be used only near the coast, in the open sea 
only low frequency bands (e.g. HF/VHF) or satellite communications can be used. 
HF/VHF communications are already well monitored by government organizations like 
the coastal guard and most of the radio bands are anyway reserved. The same rationale 
can be used for LF/MF which may not be practical for small boats. Satellite 
communications is the other form of communication used in the open sea. Small boats or 
yachts usually adopt mobile satellite terminals for communication.  
 
Mobile satellite terminals can be detected through radio frequency spectrum 
monitoring. The detection of radio frequency emissions to identify and locate a potential 
enemy is well known in the military domain and is one of the elements of electronic 
warfare (EW) or SIGINT. The main tasks of Electronic Warfare (EW) are to detect a 
transmission from an enemy unit, locate the source of the emission and eventually extract 
information from the radio frequency emissions to support understanding of the enemy 
strategy or operations. 
 
In a similar way, the authors have applied radio frequency spectrum monitoring to 
the detection and localization of a mobile satellite terminal in the open sea. This detection 
technique can be an additional source of information for the augmentation of the 
Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) and locate criminals in the sea. The same 
capability can be used for rescue operations to shorten the response time in emergencies 
(e.g., bad weather conditions). 
 
1.3.  Thuraya systems and terminals 
 
Thuraya is a company, based in the United Arab Emirates with a global market of 
their telephone service [7] and the coverage of Middle East and Southern Europe. A list 
of the available dual mode (satellite, terrestrial) handsets (product family/producers) 
includes: Thuraya / Boeing Satellite Systems, Hughes / HNS - still on market, and Ascom 
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/discontinued, Ascom, Switzerland. The provision of 260,000 units was published by 
March 2006, with the network capacity of 13,750 communication channels, but no open 
data are publicly available about local network capacities (e.g. Mediterranean area). The 
actual identity of the prepaid Thuraya SIM card holder through shipping address is not 
reliable, so it is thus hard to expect any reliable information of the handset user identity 
without intelligence data.  
 
The GSM Thuraya handset operates in the L-band with uplink channels on 
frequencies from 1626.5-1660.5 MHz, and for the downlink channel at frequencies from 
1525 MHz to 1559 MHz, where the handset emits a maximum power of 2 W, modulated 
according to π/4-CQPSK, with channel spacing of 31.2 kHz, and with gross data rates of 
195.6 kbits/s (see Technical Specifications at [7]). The handset’s capability of self-
geolocation due to the integrated GPS receiver offers the system operator the possibility 
to charge the SIM card owner according to the handset’s temporary position. 
 
1.4.  Software radio to support related security research  
 
Technological progress on the digital processing has opened the way to a novel 
implementation approach for wireless communication platforms where most of the digital 
signal processing is done in software rather than in hardware. Such systems have been 
known as Software Defined Radio (SDR). 
 
A typical SDR is able to execute all the radio frequency and base-band processing though 
software components rather then hardware components as in conventional radio 
communication systems. This capability provides a high level of reconfigurability and the 
possibility to implement a number of different algorithms for digital processing. 
 
Reference [8] describes software-defined radio as: 
“A software-defined radio (SDR) is one that has the capability – through use of 
programmable hardware (handsets) controlled by software - to tune to any frequency 
band and receive any modulation across a large frequency spectrum”.  
 
In the “Ideal Software Radio” the Digitalization starts right after the antenna (using D/A 
and A/D Converter with high dynamic range) and the elaboration is implemented by 
DSP/FPGAs with very high throughput using different software for different waveforms. 
 









Figure 2 Diagram of a Software Radio 
 
Theoretically, the hardware is able to identify the software with which it is being asked to 
interface and then to perform multiple tasks at the same time – in a similar way to a 
mobile telephone being able to act as a Global Positioning System (GPS), telephone and 
text sender simultaneously. 
 
In other words, a SDR can receive and transmit a new form of radio protocol just by 
running new software. In this way, a SDR can reconfigure itself appropriately for its 
environment and can be quickly and easily upgraded over-the-air.  
 
A specific capability which can be implemented in a SDR is spectrum sensing, where the 
SDR implements algorithms to detect the spectrum environment and the presence of 
wireless signals and services. 
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2. Detection of Mobile Satellite terminals 
 
There are two main possibilities to geo-locate a specific GSM handset in the area of 
interest: 1) by getting the information through the service provider or 2) by the on-site 
multi-node detection and characterization of transmitted electromagnetic waves.  
 
2.1.  Satellite GSM service provider’s data access 
 
In the satellite telephone service providers databases the geographical positions of the 
handset in use are refreshed since the handsets send their GPS positions regularly via 
network. But since it is against the law which protects the users personal data (i.e., 
Privacy), even for the law enforcement organizations, the access to these data bases is 
restricted. Only in the situation of high risk (such as case of rescuing from the high sea), 
the service provider can send the data as described in Figure 1. 
2.2.  Locationing by Radio spectrum monitoring 
 
An alternative way to detect mobile satellite communications is through radio 
frequency spectrum monitoring. The detection of radio frequency emissions to identify 
and locate a potential enemy, is well known in the military domain and is one of the 
elements of Electronic Warfare (EW) or Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) - intelligence 
derived from electromagnetic radiations. 
 The main tasks of EW are to detect a transmission from an enemy unit, locate the source 
of the emission and eventually extract information from the radio frequency emissions to 
support understanding of the enemy strategy or operations.  
After the detection a beamforming by a grid of antennae on known locations could take 
place, which makes base for the triangulation. Another approach for geolocation is by 
measuring the time difference of arrival (TDOA) from the known locations and solving 
the system of equations in order to get the handset’s position by trilateration.  
For both methods all the possibly involved SDRs have to rely on stable and phase 
synchronized oscillators, a requirement which is very restrictive for the expected low 
priced equipment at the L1 frequency band. The clocks could be synchronized by access 
to the GPS time and remain in constant connection in order to exchange the relevant 
location data. A similar system is also suggested but not described in [9]. 
2.3.  Detection techniques 
 
In recent time, different approaches for spectrum sensing for cognitive radio 
applications have been proposed. The commonly considered approaches are based on 
power spectrum estimation, energy detection, and cyclostationary feature detection. 
Power spectrum estimation may not work reliably in the low Signal-to-Noise ratio (SNR) 
regime. Energy detection, on the other hand, is subject to uncertainty in noise and 
interference statistics. In addition, neither power spectrum estimation nor energy 
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detection are able to distinguish among the primary user signals, secondary user signals, 
or interference. Cyclostationary detection allows classifying co-existing signals 
exhibiting cyclostationarity at different cyclic frequencies, relaxing assumptions on noise 
statistics and has reliable performance even in the very low SNR regime. In this report, 
we describe the application of cyclostationary spectrum sensing to detect the signal of 
GSM Thuraya communication systems. 
 
3. Experimental setup and method 
A general approach for the detection is shown in Figure 3. Antennae eavesdrop 
exchanging signals between the handset and communication satellite in the line of sight 
area and lead them through the low noise amplifier to the attached spectrum analyzer.  
 
Figure 3 Experimental setup for uplink channel monitoring. 
3.1.  Downlink channel monitoring 
 
A downlink channel of the Thuraya-2 geostationary satellite was investigated near 
the Building 72, JRC in late October 2009 by the use of patch active GPS antenna 
GAACZ by Jinchang with bias tee, parabolic antenna type Eurasis with LNB skew set 
ability (Metronic), a satellite TV tuner and a RSA Real time Spectrum Analyzer 3408B 
(Tektronix). Parabolic antenna was pointed to the Thuraya-2 with azimuth 135 deg. and 
27 deg. elevation, with LNB skew setting of 25 deg., at the JRC Location in Ispra, Italy. 
Polarization shift at reflection from the parabolic antenna was intuitively used to 
get the right hand circular polarization (RHCP) into the patch antenna from the left HCP 
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signals from the observed satellite. Backscatter noise of the patch antenna was rejected by 
insertion of the GAACZ antenna into a metal housing which was placed as a reception 





Figure 4 Downlink antennae: Eurasis, Ø = 60 cm;  
GAACZ-D, center frequency 1575.42 MHz ± 3 MHz. 
 
 
Satellite INTELSAT 12 (45.0 
E) 
THURAYA 2 (44.0 
E) 
TÜRKSAT 2A (42.0 
E) 
Distance 38945 km 38896 km 38801 km 
Elevation   26.4° 26.9° 27.9° 
Azimuth 134.2° 135.3° 137.5° 
LNB 
skew  
- 30° - 29.4° - 28.1° 
Table 1Parameters to get the satellite reception 
 
By aligning the positions of the two TV satellites, received by the SAT TV tuner, 
we were able to get the Thuraya-2 position.  
3.2.  Uplink channel monitoring 
 
Using the first generation of the Thuraya’s handsets (Hughes 7101) also an uplink 
channel was tested with two setups, following the scheme described in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5 (left) an experiment setup during test at waypoint WP1, (right) a sketch of the tests 
with handset at three waypoints. 
 
The first field setup (March 2010, 41 measurements) used spectrum analyzer MS2721B 
(Anritsu) equipped with a 900-2600MHz WA5VJB antenna as described in Figure 5 to 
investigate the similarity of spectrograms (i.e. power vs. time/frequency patterns) of the 




Figure 6 An experiment setup for the second field testing the influence of the distance, 
antenna orientation and multipath on a signal power. 
 
For the second field setup (April, July 2010; 49 measurements) a RSA 3408B (Tektronix) 
with antenna WA5VJB was used. In a later stage, the more powerdul RSA 6114A 
(Tektronix) spectrum analyzer with Schwarzbeck antenna ESLP 9145 was used. The 
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spectrum analyzer was kept in laboratory of the Building 72, while the handset was 
moved around (from 5 m up to 250 m). 
3.3.  Method 1: Power sensing 
 
Power sensing is the optimal detector when the noise power threshold is known. The 
spectrum sensing algorithm determines the presence/absence of primary users on the 
basis of the energy of the received signal. The sensing is performed by dividing the 
spectrum into many subsets of frequency bands and computing the energy associated 
with it within the sub-bands. The computed energy is then compared against a threshold. 
 
 
Figure 7 On Thuraya downlink band noise level was established (wide scan). 
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Figure 8 A standard GMR-1 channelization is observed (narrow scan) 
 
In the first step, the noise level was calculated (see Figure 7). In the second step, the 
standard GMR-1 signal was acquired (see Figure 
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8).
 
Figure 9 Spectrogram of the uplink power sensing of the GSM Thuraya. 
  
Figure 9 describes the spectrogram during the deactivation phase, when the antenna was 
moved from WP3 towards WP1 (for the WayPoints refer to Figure 5). The following 
parameters were used: GPS position MS2721B: N 45 48 35, E 8 37 48, time of sweep of 
frame 0 = 03-19-2010,06:57:43, time of sweep of frame 155 = 03-19 2010,06:58:35,  
frequency span 5 MHz, calculated time scale 52"/155 frames => 0.3355"per frame. 
 
The binary hypothesis test for sensing the spectrum can be obtained by comparing the 
decision metric with a detection threshold λ. The detection probability (PD) and the 
probability of false alarm (PFA) are dependent on the signal/noise ratio, which can be 
higher or lower than λ. This type of detection algorithm is easy to implement and it is has 
low complexity but it has strong limitations. The decision threshold can be chosen by 
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Figure 10 Uplink: median power levels get during 49 attempts on different locations and 
under different signal propagation conditions. 
 
The influence on faded propagation conditions is clearly shown in Figure 11, where the 
handset’s transmitted signals during deactivation phase are presented. Activation data 
sequences typically take cca. 200 Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) frames while 
deactivation a half of it. A typical data deactivation sequence consists of 7 TDMA 40 ms 
frames, (e.g. high power. 5 ms + low power 35 ms) ending by variable number of low 
power TDMA frames.  
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Figure 11 Uplink: Changing the power level during the deactivation phase under different 
conditions of signal propagation. 
 
3.4.  Method 2: Cyclostationarity 
  
Cyclostationary feature detection has a very high computational complexity, 
because the algorithm has to estimate the correlation between spectral components of 
signals. In most operational scenarios, spectrum sensing algorithms must execute in real 
time on terminals or computing platforms with limited power. Consequently, it is 
important that the detection algorithms are very efficient. In comparison to classical 
cyclostationary analysis, computationally efficient cyclostationary detection algorithms 
have been defined (see [11]).  
 
Cyclostationarity analysis algorithms generally fall into two classes: those that average in 
frequency (frequency smoothing) and those that average in time (time smoothing). 
Although both classes of algorithms produce similar approximations to the cyclic 
spectrum, time smoothing algorithms are considered to be more computationally efficient 
for general cyclic spectral analysis. 
 
In present report, we also apply the Strip Spectral Correlation Algorithm (SSCA) 
to the detection of GSM Thuraya signal. The report makes a comparison among the two 
spectrum sensing techniques: the cyclostationarity approach and SSCA. The technical 
details on both approaches are presented in Annex I. 
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During on-field test, it was observed that the processing time of the SSCA 
algorithm for the same resolution of the positive alpha plane was significantly faster than 
the classical cyclostationary time smoothing approach. The extraction of cyclostationary 
signature from the received QPSK signal was based on the known GMR-1 uplink channel 
parameters [12], however the approach is suitable for the short signal observation times 
and does not require any frequency nor the phase synchronization as described in [13]. 
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Figure 15 The distortive effect of multipath fading on normalized power results is presented 
for the positive  in the SSCA plane for the uplink channel 
 
 
Figure 16 Cyclic Power Spectral Density (CPS) of the Uplink GSM Thuraya signal in 
presence of disturbances and multipath fading 
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4. Conclusions  
The report presents a monitoring system to detect mobile satellite terminals in the 
open sea. The monitoring system is based on high gain antennas and amplifiers and the 
correlation of the known spectrum responses. The monitoring system can be implemented 
using low-cost component and it can be deployed in the patrolling boats.  A description 
of this solution has also been presented at the ELMAR conference in Croatia [15]. 
 
The prototype can be improved and deployed on the vessels of the coast guard or 
the navy, which have the responsibility to patrol the sea for illegal immigrants and piracy 
activities. A similar monitoring system can also be installed on Unmanned Air Vehicles 
(UAV) used for the same purpose. 
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